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Given the high opportunity cost of patenting in countries with weak intellectual property right 
(IPR) protection, it is paradoxical to observe an increase of patenting activities by multinational 
corporations and indigenous companies in some of those countries in the past decade. We 
undertake a large-scale firm-level study in the context of China (an emerging economy with 
weak IPR protection) to investigate the cost and benefit associated with patenting activities there. 
We employ the method of propensity score matching to investigate whether the total factor 
productivity of multinational corporations and indigenous companies grew faster after they 
applied for patents in China than had they not done so, and also compare the increase of total 
factor productivity at various levels of market competition. 
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Over the last three decades, belief in the importance of patents has contributed to the 
strengthening of patent protection and subsequently patenting boom in many countries (Kortum 
and Lerner, 1999; Hu and Jefferson, 2009). However, as Arora et al. (2008) argued, the pro-
patent changes in legislation and business strategies proceed with limited empirical evidence on 
the impact of patent protection on industrial innovation. It is well known that patenting is not the 
only method to appropriate returns on investment on innovation. In many industries firms use 
secrecy or lead time rather than patent as appropriation methods (Levin et al., 1987; Arundel and 
Kabla, 1998). To quantify the effect of patent on innovation in the US industries, Arora et al. 
(2008) employed a structural model to estimate the proportional increment in the value of 
innovation due to patent protection (patent premium). They found that firms that patented 
innovations are expected to earn almost 50 percent more on average than if they had not patented 
those innovations. However, they also concluded that in most industries the unconditional patent 
premium, which is the average premium of all innovations (including those not patented), does 
not compensate the opportunity cost of patenting due to information disclosure, likelihood of 
inventing around and the cost of enforcement etc. 
 
As the world economy became increasingly integrated, Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are 
strongly motivated to move their research and development (R&D) activities to emerging 
economies as a means of lowering R&D costs and operating close to their markets.1 This trend 
dovetails with the growth of indigenous R&D activities in the emerging economies. As a result, 
more and more inventive activities take place in emerging economies, beyond the traditionally 
innovative triadic regions of Europe, Japan, and the United States. A remarkable characteristic of 
the emerging economies is that in these countries the intellectual property right (IPR) protection 
is weak. Thus the opportunity cost of patenting there may be much higher than that in Europe, 
Japan and the United States and patent premium in the emerging economies can be fairly modest. 
This reasoning is confirmed by Keupp et al. (2012). Keupp et al. conducted an in-depth case 
study on the motivations of 11 foreign firms for patenting in China. They reported that some 
firms encountered serious infringements and sometimes the infringements can occur on a weekly 
basis. Nevertheless, it seems to be paradoxical that despite the weak IPR protection and possibly 
low patent premium in China, patenting activities have surged in China in the last ten years or so. 
In 2011 China surpassed the US and became the country which received the most invention 
patent applications in the world. Both foreign firms and domestic firms contributed to this trend. 
Data shows that the number of foreign patent applications in China grew at averagely 15 percent 
annually during 2000–2011. To our best knowledge, there has not been any large-scale firm-
level study that investigates the cost and benefit of patenting activities in emerging economies 
with weak IPR protection (for example, China).  
 
Standard patenting theory holds that firms apply for patents to prevent others from making, using, 
or selling the patented products or technologies. However, reality is more complex than the 
                                                     
1 According to the International  Monetary  Fund’s  definition, emerging economies include Argentina, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South 




theory suggests. There are many other reasons for which firms file for patents. For instance, 
many companies apply for patents for purely defensive purposes, hoping to build up their patent 
portfolios to prevent others from suing them for infringement (Ziedonis, 2004). They also use 
patents as bargaining chips to reach cross-licensing agreements with their competitors, thereby 
cutting through patent application thickets (Shapiro, 2001). Other companies, particularly start-
ups, file for patents to enhance their prospects for attracting investors, being acquired, or issuing 
initial public offerings (Graham and Sichelman, 2008; Hsu and Ziedonis, forthcoming). Patent 
premium is thus likely to be affected by the purposes of patenting activities. In the context of 
emerging economies, local  rivals’  patents  may  negatively  impact  productivity  of  a  MNC,  
particularly when the local rivals’  patents  overlap  with  the  MNC’s  in scope. However, local 
rivals’  preemptive  or  defensive  patenting  might  stimulate  the  MNC’s  own  patenting  activities  
which may lead to productivity gain of MNCs. The effect of competition on MNC’s  patent 
premium is thus theoretically ambiguous. That said, we know little about the relationship 
between patent premium and strategic interaction between MNCs and competing local firms in 
countries with weak IPR protection. Holding the same view, Arora et al. (2008) admitted that 
ignoring strategic interaction between rivals is one of the limitations of their study on patent 
premium of the US firms.  
 
This study aims to contribute to the abovementioned streams of literature by quantifying patent 
premium of MNCs and local firms in countries with weak IPR protection. In particular, we 
investigate the relationship between patent premium and competition among MNCs and local 
firms. We constructed a novel firm-patent dataset by linking the Database of Annual Survey of 
Industrial Enterprises (maintained by the National Bureau of Statistics of China) and the 
Database of China Patent Abstract (maintained by the State Intellectual Property Right of China, 
SIPO). We employed the econometric technique of propensity score matching in data analysis.  
 
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
 
2.1 Resource-based view, competitive advantage theory and patent as unique resource 
 
We draw on resource-based view and competitive advantage theory to explain the patent 
premium that MNCs and local firms can obtain in countries with weak IPR protection. The 
resource-based view considers firms as bundles of heterogeneous resources that include tangible 
and intangible assets, operational processes, and products (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). 
Competitive advantage is defined as the strategic advantage a firm has over its rivals within its 
competitive industry. A firm can achieve superior performance and build up its competitive 
advantage through its unique resources. Rival firms can erode a  focal  firm’s competitive 
advantage if they possess similar resources that pose threat to the focal firm. Sustainability of the 
focal  firm’s  competitive  advantage  will  therefore  be  determined  by  whether  rival firms are able 
to imitate such key resources and whether the focal firm can create barriers to such imitation.  
 
Because of the monopoly nature of patent, it can be used by firms as a key resource to achieve 
competitive advantage (Teece, 1986, Hall, 1992). However, rival firms can invent around a focal 
firm’s  patents. In  this  case,  the  uniqueness  of  resource  reflected  by  the  focal  firm’s  patents  is  
compromised. In addition, in so-called complex product industries such as electronics and semi-
conductor, a new and commercializable product or process is comprised of numerous separately 
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patentable elements; hence rival firms may hold patents that are necessary for the focal firm to 
produce and sell its products. Therefore, firms have to make strategic decisions in the course of 
patenting as returns on the investment in patents (patent premium) are not only determined by 
the value of the underlying innovations, but also by the extent to which the patents can render 
competitive advantage to the firms.    
 
The strategies that a firm uses to create barriers to imitation are known  as  “isolating  
mechanisms”.  Isolating  mechanisms  are associated with corporate culture, managerial 
capabilities, information asymmetries and intellectual property rights such as patents (Lippman 
and Rumelt, 1982; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Reed and DeFillippi, 1990). In addition to 
employing isolating mechanisms, a firm also needs to modify and develop resources in order to 
excel in future market competition as the requirements for adequate resources are constantly 
changing in a volatile market environment (Chaharbaghi and Lynch, 1999). Moreover, a 
competitor  can  enter  a  market  with  a  powerful  resource  that  may  invalidate  the  incumbent  firm’s  
competitive advantage (Barney, 1986). In response, incumbent firms can strengthen their 
existing resources and develop new resources to cope with the competition brought by entrants. 
Because patent has both entry-deterring and entry-promoting effects, incumbent firms can 
harvest greater patent premium by patenting more aggressively than before. Entrants can also 
patent actively to build up their competitive advantage against the monopoly power that 




Emerging economies, compared to mature economies, are characterized by a high-velocity 
environment where market growth is rapid but the positions of market players change constantly 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000). In addition, emerging economies are typically with weak IPR protection 
(Zhao, 2006). Contrary to common understanding, the toughest competitors in emerging 
economies are often local firms, which can be more effective than their foreign counterparts in 
developing strategies that suit the markets (Walters and Samiee, 2003). Local firms may know 
better than MNCs with regard to whether patenting can create value for their respective 
innovations in a market environment where IPR protection is weak. However, MNCs are 
typically equipped with superior technological capability. To sustain their superior performance, 
MNCs can protect their superior technological knowledge through patents which prevent their 
local competitors from imitation. In this study, we use total factor productivity (TFP) to measure 
firm performance. We consider a firm obtains positive patent premium if it achieves faster TFP 
growth through patenting than had it not applied for patents, ceteris paribus. With these 
definitions we develop the Hypothesis 1a and 1b: 
 
H1a: MNCs in countries with weak IPR protection obtains positive patent premium. 
H1b: Local firms in countries with weak IPR protection obtains positive patent premium. 
 
In emerging economies, MNCs face fierce competition from local firms. Local firms can take 
advantage of technological spillovers from MNCs to improve their own technological 
capabilities, aiming to offer high value-added products or services. Local firms may also imitate 
MNCs’  products  and  services  to  launch  their  new  ones  with  incremental  innovations.  Local  firms’  
patenting  activities  can  challenge  MNCs’  leading  position  and  reduce  the  value  of  MNCs’  
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patents  if  local  firms’  patents  and  MNCs’  overlap  in  scope. Local  firms’  patenting  activities  will  
in  one  hand  reduce  MNCs’  patent  premium  by  crowding  in  the  technological  or  product  space  in 
which MNCs  operate  and  exacerbating  patent  thickets  that  compromise  MNCs’  freedom  of  
design or manufacture. On the other hand,  local  firms’  patenting  activities  will  stir  MNCs  to  seek  
more patents than otherwise, which would enhance patent premium of MNCs. It thus follows 
that  the  premium  of  MNC’s  patenting  activities  is  contingent  on  the  patenting  activities  of  
competing local firms and vice versa. This leads to Hypothesis 2a and 2b: 
 
H2a: The patent premium of MNCs in countries with weak IPR protection increases with the 
intensity of competition from local firms. 
H2b: The patent premium of local firms in countries with weak IPR protection increases with the 
intensity of competition from MNCs. 
 




To investigate the above hypotheses, we constructed a novel firm-patent dataset by linking two 
databases  together.  One  is  China’s  National  Bureau  of  Statistics’  Annual  Survey  of  Industrial  
Enterprises (ASIE), which is a census of all non-state owned firms with more than RMB five 
million in revenue and all state-owned firms in China. There are 146,251,  147,413,  155,935,  
165,988,  179,749,  255,266,  269,233,  301,960,  336,732 manufacturing firms in the dataset for 
the years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively. The dataset 
contains more than 50 firm-level statistical indicators, including input, output, R&D expenditure, 
capital composition, employment, geographical location, the industry in which a firm operates 
(at the four-digit level), ownership status, and assets and liabilities. The other database is the 
China Patent Abstract Database (CPAD). It includes over four million patent applications 
submitted by domestic and foreign applicants to the Chinese State Intellectual Property Office 
(SIPO) from 1985 when the patent system in China was established till 2009. The information 
provided in the database on each patent includes patent application and publication number, 
application and publication date, patent number, title, International Patent Classification class, 
abstract, claims, legal status, and so on. 
 
From the ASIE we selected all the 8,585 firms in the following two two-digit manufacturing 
sectors for this study: Electronics and Telecommunication (ICT) and Precision Instruments and 
Office Machinery. We hired nine research assistants to manually search the names of the 8,585 
firms in the CPAD. After the cleaning, we obtained the final patent dataset including 23,074 
patents from 1,807 firms. 
 
To our best knowledge, only Eberhardt et al. (2012) have made similar efforts to construct a 
firm-patent database for China. However, our method achieves more comprehensive coverage 
and  accurate  linkage  between  firms  and  patents  than  Eberhardt  et  al.’s  method  does.  This  is  
because, first of all, we linked the ASIE and the CPAD through firm names in Chinese, but 
Eberhardt  et  al.  linked  the  ASIE  in  Chinese  and  the  European  Patent  Office’s PATSTAT 
database in English through a bridging database Oriana of Bureau Van Dijk. As Eberhardt et al. 
documented, the Chinese firm names in the PATSTAT were either Chinese characters, or pinyin 
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transcription into the Latin alphabet, or a translation of the Chinese names into English, or any 
combination of the three. Our method improves accuracy in the sense that we avoided errors 
resulting from linking names in Chinese, Latin alphabet or English. Second, only 23,000 firms 
are included in the Oriana database, which are about one tenth of the total firms in the ASIE. The 
best efforts by Eberhardt et al. can only establish 10 percent of all possible linkages. Our method 
hence achieves much more comprehensive coverage than theirs.  
 
3.2 Econometric framework 
 
3.2.1 Calculation of productivity 
 
We calculate the productivity of the MNCs and local firms through the semi-parametric method 
designed  by  Olley  and  Pakes  (1996).  Olley  and  Pakes’  estimator  (OP)  modeled  unobserved  
productivity as a function of observable investment and capital. In comparison to Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) estimator, the OP estimator has the following advantages. It allows controlling for 
the simultaneity bias when estimating production functions, without having to rely on 
instruments. It also controls for potential selection bias in estimating production functions. The 
coefficients of the labor and material inputs obtained by the OP estimator are smaller than those 
of the OLS, but the coefficient of capital is greater.  
 
With the coefficients of the production function in hand, we can recover a Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) measure 𝜀  of firm i in year t in the following way 
 
(1) 𝜀 = 𝑦 − 𝑏 𝑙 − 𝑏 𝑘 , 
 
where y, l, k denote the log of value added, labor and capital, respectively. The parameters 𝑏  and 
𝑏  denote the OP estimators for labor and capital respectively.  
 
3.2.2 Productivity dynamics and patenting activities 
 
After obtaining the productivity 𝜀 , we rescale the time periods in such a way that a firm starts 
patenting at t = 0. Let 𝜀  be productivity of firm i at period t following entry in patenting 
activities at t =0. The variable 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡  takes on the value one if a firm i starts to apply for patent. 
We follow the econometric program evaluation literature (De Loecker, 2007; Imbens and 
Wooldridge, 2009) to define the average effect of entry into patenting activity on productivity as 
 
(2) 𝐸{𝜀 − 𝜀 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 1} = 𝐸{𝜀 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 1} − 𝐸{𝜀 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 1}, 
 
where the superscript equals to 1 if the firm apply for patent and 0 otherwise. The crucial 
problem in this analysis is that 𝜀 , the counterfactual or the productivity of a patenting firm had 
it not applied for patents, is not observable.  
 
In order to identify this counterfactual group we assume that all differences between a focal 
patenting firm and the non-patenting firms can be captured by a vector of observables including 
the pre-patenting productivity of the firms. The intuition is to find a group that is as close as 
possible to the focal patenting firm in terms of its predicted probability to start applying for 
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patents. More formally, we apply the propensity score matching method as proposed by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). This boils down to estimating a probit model with a dependent 
variable equal to 1 if a firm starts applying for patents and zero otherwise on lagged observables 
including productivity. 
 
The probability model of starting to apply for patents (the propensity score) can be represented 
as follows 
 
(3) Pr 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 , = 1 = Φ 𝜀 , , 𝑋 ,  , 
 
where Φ(.)  is  the  normal  cumulative  distribution  function.  The  probability  of  starting  to  apply  for  
patents  is  regressed  on  variables  prior  to  the  period  t  =  0  (we  use  subscript  −1  to  denote  this  
period). The most important variable in estimating the propensity score is the productivity 
variable 𝜀 , . 𝑋 ,  are the other explanatory variables which account for the differences in 
productivity. They include size of the firm, R&D expenditure, ownership status, and year and 
industry dummies etc. The matching is based on the method of the nearest neighbor, which 
selects the non-patenting firms which have a propensity score pi closest to that of the patenting 
firm. 
 
Once we have this counterfactual (a set C of control firms) in hand we use a difference-in-
differences methodology to assess the impact of applying for patents on productivity. The 
estimator of the patent premium β is calculated in the following way. Assume there are N firms 
that indeed applied for patents and a set C of control firms.  𝜀  and 𝜀  are the estimated 
productivity of the firms indeed applying for patents and the controls, respectively. Denote C(i) 
as the set of control units matched to the firm i with a propensity score of pi. The number of 
control firms that are matched with the firm i is denoted as 𝑁  and the weight 𝑤 =  if j ∈  
C(i) and zero otherwise. The estimator β at every year t after the decision to start applying for 
patents is given by 
 
(4) 𝛽 = ∑(𝜀 − ∑ 𝑤 𝜀 )∈ ( )  
 
In short, we estimate the productivity premium of firms that started applying for patents at each 
year t compared with a weighted average of productivity of a control group based on nearest 
neighbor matching at every year t. To test H1, we implement the above analysis separately on the 
MNCs and local firms. 
 
3.2.3 Productivity dynamics, patenting activities and competition 
 
To test H2, we classify the firms into a strong-competition group and a weak-competition group. 
We then perform the analysis in Section 2.2.2 separately for these two groups and compare the 
results with the total sample.  
 
The remaining issue would be which criteria we use to classify the firms into the two groups. 
Due to lack of citation information of the Chinese patents in the CPAD, we are not able to 
construct citation-based (patent thicket) indexes such as those outlined by Zeidonis (2004) and 
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von Graevenitz et al. (2011) to measure the extent to which the patents of the focal firm overlap 
with those of the rival firms. Instead, we construct an entry-based index in the following way. 
Using the information of patent class, we can identify which firms applied for patents in each of 
the six-digit patent classes and also pinpoint the six-digit patent classes where each firm applied 
for patents. We are thus able to spot an entrant firms i in a six-digit patent class r in year t. The 
entrant firm is defined as the firm that in the first time applied for patent in the class r. We can 
calculate the intensity of entry (number of entrant firms divided by number of incumbent firms) 
into the technologies (six-digit patent classes) in year t. Using a weighted share of the focal 
firm’s  patents  in  the  six-digit patent classes, we can obtain an overall index to measure the 
competition that the focal firm faced in all its technological areas. Assuming that a high intensity 
of entry leads to high-level competition, we are able to classify firms into strong-competition and 
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